Answer PLSC COMP 5

'''Is research in Poli Sci generalizable? What are the implications and underlying assumptions with regards to generalizability, of different methodological approaches to studying politics? Where do you stand - that is a) is generalizability a desired feature if theory and why? b) assess several (more than two) methodological approaches to CP in terms of generalizability; c) what approach do you think is most sensible and why? Provide one example of at least one each of generalizable and one non-generalizable theories in CP and explain their impact and relevance.'''

=On Generalizability= KKV

Peters

McTheis

Collier

Elster

Green and Shapiro

Clarke and Primo

=Different Methodological Approaches:=

Rational Choice
Arrow, Downs, and Olson are the three pillars upon which much of the modern Rational Choice scholarship rests (at least within American Politics, and according to Green and Shapiro). Arrow is the progenitor of the Impossibility Theorem; Downs is the progenitor of the Median Voter Theorem; and Olson worked up a new approach to interest groups and collective action.

Rational choice explanations generally involve utility maximization of some sort, generally in the form of expected utility. Actors are assumed to have goals, to be aware of those goals, and to have the ability to take action in order to achieve those goals. These goals represent preferences that are ranked and transitive.

It should be noted that there is nothing out of the ordinary in these assumptions with respect to rational choice theorists. Non-explicitly rational choice scholarship often assumes (though less explicitly) that actors have goals and behave in ways that maximize their utility. Consider, for example, Segal and Spaeth's (2002) attitudinal model of judicial decision-making on the U.S. Supreme Court. Implicit in the argument is that justices on the Court will, under certain conditions and in certain cases, decided in ways that reflect their personal ideologies, thereby extracting utility from the opinion rendered. Few would jump to classify SCAMR as a piece of rational choice scholarship; however the basic assumptions are the same.

The Law & Economics literature is rich with rational choice explanations of existing legal rules as well as a normative command that the law should consider individuals to behave in rational ways in response to legal rules (see R. Posner, E. Posner, Becker, Calabresi, Easterbrook, Shavell, Viscusi, Hirsh, etc.). Wealth maximization rises to the level of economic efficiency. Risk allocation determines legal liability.

A major problem with rational choice explanations of individual behavior is the existence of multiple equilibria. Ex ante, we cannot make predictions from these models about which equilibria will obtain. Perhaps more troubling, though, is the possibility that scholars observe some phenomenon (say reelection rates in the House) and the undertake to fashion a rational choice explanation consistent with these data. Unless, however, the explanation is tested against other legislatures and other reelection rates, the explanation will be entirely post hoc and of little use. What is missing is the effort towards rejecting the explanation.

Analytic Narrative
Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast (1998).

"We call our approach analytic narrative because it combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history."

Analytic narratives are problem driven, not theory driven. They employ various degrees of rational choice analysis.

The conclusion of the book takes a shot at Green and Shapiro. The Analytic Narrative is explicitly an attempt to provide some empirical meat for the rational choice bones.

Examples
Chapter One: Avner Greif (1998) Greif Summary