Answer PLSC COMP 3

'''Write an essay that explores the role of repression as a governmental tool. Discuss how this tool will vary with governmental type. Explain the alternative theories regarding this concept. Based on the empirical research, which theory offers the promising explanation of the use of repression?'''

=Random works to consult=

Examples of political repression

 * Jackson (1978): Article about Pol Pot's Cambodia. Repression is used under the aegis of internal security--Killings to eliminate the national security threat of overthrow, espionage, imperialist plots.  Forced relocation from cities to the country scatters revolutionary strength.  This is also accomplished through the elimination of private property, radical egalitarianism, collectivization.


 * Decalo (1985): Article about African Personal Dictatorships. Empirical examination of personal dictatorships in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and the C.A.R.  The study would provide empirical support for Geddes' claim that personalist  dictatorships are most repressive (although Decalo is not a comparison across regime types).


 * McDermott (1995); Stalinist Terror in the Comintern: New Perspectives.


 * Kiernan (2003): Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia. Cambodia and East Timor.

Theoretical Treatment of Repression

 * Przeworski (1991) Przeworski book summary. Democracy and the market is a conditional theory of democratic consolidation based on economic performance.  Looking at post-transition Eastern European countries vis-a-vis Latin America, Przeworski posits "the durability of the new democracies will depend...not only on their institutional structure and the ideology of the major political forces, but to a large extent on their economic performance.  Moustafa (2007) echoes this idea, citing the protection of property rights in Egypt as a major factor influencing that country's economic and political stability (even under dictatorial rule).

The key puzzle: Democracy makes winners and losers. Why would the losers choose to comply with the results? The key: democratic institutions help give political actors a "long time horizon. . . They allow them to think about the future rather than being concerned exclusively with present outcomes. . . . Political forces comply with present defeats because they believe that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to advance their interests in the future" (19).


 * Henderson (1991): Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression. Finds that the degree of democracy, the extent of inequality, and economic growth rate are good empirical predictors of repression.
 * Structuralist explanation. Does not take into account the preferences and strategic interaction between actors.


 * Geddes (1999)Summary of Geddes. There are 3 ideal types of authoritarian regime.  While Geddes is more interested in regime collapse, her game theoretic approach has some implications for the use of repression.  In particular, personalistic regimes facing exogenous shocks tend to crack down in order to hold together a coalition of supporters (playing a stag hunt) who see their collective gains threatened.


 * Olson (1993)Olson Article Summary. This is a great article that makes Olson's point more clearly and concisely than in Power and Prosperity, below.  Here, Olson fashions his roving bandit versus stationary bandit theory of government extraction of resources.  Both the dictator and the subjects are better off under a stationary bandit regime because the dictator will moderate his extraction of resources along a long time horizon.  This allows the subjects to invest time and resources into production (because they get to keep a share of the profits).  Were the dictator to take everything, then there is no incentive for production investment.  Given the uncertain nature of dictatorships (they are short lived), the sort of economic stability that is produces under a long time horizon is nigh impossible.  Property and contract rights collapse, long term growth becomes evanescent, and regime discontent rises.  Repression, then, must also rise if the dictator is to hold on to power.  But repression costs money, so more resources need to be extracted.  Vicious.


 * McGuire and Olson (1996). The Economies of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force.  Same Olsonian argument about the roving and stationary bandits.  But adds in a bit about the level of extraction and public good provision in democracies.


 * Wintrobe (1998). Ah, good ol' Ronnie Win.  "although not all dictatorships are alike, they follow patterns that can be understood in rational-choice terms and which can be predicted given certain broad characteristics of the regime."  "if regimes are to have any permanence, institutions must be created or maintained which deal with [the problem of internal and external threats] by regularizing payments to its supporters and by providing for the systematic marginalization or elimination of its enemies.  These institutions of repression and redistribution define the dictatorship."  The dictator's dilemma is that to stay in power they must exercise power over the people;  yet the exercise of power creates discontent and threatens the dictator's future in power.
 * Thus, Wintrobe creates a typology of dictatorship forms:
 * Totalitarians. Goals: Maximize repression up until the point up decreasing returns (in terms of loyalty). High levels of repression and loyalty.
 * Tinpots. Goals: repress only to the modest extent necessary to stay in office and collect the fruits of monopolizing political power. Low levels of both repression and loyalty.
 * Timocrats. Goals: benevolent dictators who genuinely care about the subjects and exercise power solely for the collective benefit. Low levels of repression, but high levels of loyalty.
 * Tyrants. Stays in power through violence. However does not have the ability to strongly repress. Therefore has less of loyalty even though high repression. Fall between totalitarians and tinpots.


 * Olson (2000)Olson Book Summary. Here's the longer and more popular press version of the bandit argument, above.  Because the second wiki says it best, I'll quote: "If a roving bandit robs a village, he takes everything. But if a stationary bandit (e.g. a king) robs a village, he will take as much as he can without killing his source of future revenue. This king will set tax rates at a level that maximizes his revenues; because GDP falls as taxes rise, the king maximizes his revenue at a tax rate far lower than 100%. Moreover, the king will find it in his interest to fund certain public goods to promote domestic growth, which further increases his revenues. This is the other invisible hand: autocrats have incentives to work toward the public good even when they have no real intention besides predation. (Tax rates and spending on public goods are defined by the "reciprocal rule.")"